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INTRODUCTION
As a city, we are in some way responsible for each child in our
midst. The obligation and opportunity to stand in loco parentis—in
the place of a parent—is applicable to state and local governments to
some highly contested and complicated extent. The contests and
complexities are revealed in our family law jurisprudence, for
although the field of family law is often belittled or trivialized, it is in
family jurisprudence that a government’s obligations to its people are
perhaps most tellingly tested. In what follows, I will explore the reach
and limits of those obligations.
First, I will discuss the concept of human dignity and how it
relates—or should relate—to making judgments about what a
government owes to its child citizens. I will draw on constitutional
theories that have come to prominence since the World Wars and
caused governments around the world to address more directly the
*
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positive duties states may owe to their people and that their people
may owe to one another. These theories are instructive, despite the
ironic fact that they simultaneously enhance our sense of duty to
children and our duty of restraint against invading their families’
autonomy.
Having laid a foundation of dignitary principles, I will discuss a set
of family law cases that have tested the limits of governments’
responsibilities to children and to their families. I will first discuss the
old chestnuts, Meyer v. Nebraska1 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2
two Supreme Court cases from the 1920s that laid the groundwork for
the still bitterly contested doctrine of substantive due process. Next, I
will discuss Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 the 1972 Supreme Court case in
which Amish families challenged a requirement that they send their
children to school until the age of sixteen. Finally, I will discuss
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services4 and
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,5 two cases in which the Supreme Court
found that state and local governments could not be held accountable
for lapses in their efforts to protect families and children. I will
conclude with a comment on the usefulness of the concept of human
dignity in calibrating governments’ and families’ competing authority
over, and complementary duty towards, their children.
I. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY
I set out my understanding of human dignity rather circuitously. I
start with a definition of fundamental right, as that term is understood
in United States constitutional law. I then link the notion of
fundamental right and the notion of human right. Only then will I be
in a position to describe how I understand human dignity in the
context of American constitutional and political thought.
The Supreme Court gives special protection to certain rights,
regardless of whether they are mentioned in our Constitution’s text,
because these rights are deemed to be basic components of human
freedom.6 Histories and traditions of recognizing a right that is

1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925).
3. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
5. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
6. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“[T]he ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
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fundamental in this way appear to be safe indicators that a right is
fundamental.7 However, there are reasons to prefer a test that first
asks whether the exercise of the right is socially benign, and if it is,
then asks whether the suppression of that right is socially justifiable.8
Careful balancing of calls for order and for liberty can seem more
defensible than reference to what we have customarily done.9
As the world has grown smaller, lawmakers in the United States
and elsewhere have increasingly looked beyond national borders for
guidance in determining what rights are so fundamental that they
should be protected by national and international law.10 At the same
time, transnational bodies have undertaken codification of individual
and collective rights that are broadly understood to be fundamental.11
In transnational contexts, one may speak not just of the civil rights
that should be guaranteed by a polity to its members, but also more
generally of human rights that should be guaranteed to all. Since
World War II, as international rights codifications have proliferated,
the use of the term human rights has become more common in legal
discourse and is now commonly associated with the concept of human
dignity.12
In this same post World War II period, the concept of human
dignity has come to carry new associations: those who drafted new
constitutions in response to acts and political arrangements that were
widely regarded as atrocities identified respect for human dignity as
the principle those atrocities had violated. Most notably, Germany
316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to
marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use contraception,
ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, [Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)].”).
7. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612–13 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
8. See id. at 2602 (majority opinion) (“The right to marry is fundamental as a
matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone. They
rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”).
9. See id. at 2598 (describing an analytic method that “respects our history and
learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present”).
10. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
57 (2010).
11. The United Nations is required to publish all such treaties. See U.N. Charter
art. 102, ¶ 1. Such treaties are also available online. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION https://treaties.un.org [https://perma.cc/L7Y2-DLQU].
12. See Bas de Gaay Fortman, Equal Dignity in International Human Rights, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY 355–61 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds.,
2014).
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after the Holocaust and South Africa after apartheid built new
constitutions with cornerstones of respect for human dignity.13 This, I
argue, was a key development toward understanding human dignity
through protest against its denial.
Contemporary scholars point out that while dignity was once a
term referencing the accouterments of noble rank or status, the term
human dignity is now understood in legal and moral discourse to
reference the properties or entitlements of “human beings as human
beings, not dependent on any particular additional status.”14 To
affront human dignity is, then, to treat a human being or a group of
human beings without regard for their entitlements as members of the
human species. In a world grown increasingly suspicious of hierarchy,
it is, to borrow a religious concept, to treat them not as if they were a
little lower than angels, but as if they were something lower still.15
All that I have said invites the following question: how do we
decide what behavior is an affront to the dignity of human beings? I
propose that we decide what affronts human dignity by reference to
two kinds of human aversion. First, affronts to human dignity are (or
would be in a condition of freedom) intolerable to the victim or
subject. Second, they are intolerable in the consensus judgment of
observers. They are acts that human beings will neither endure
without coercion nor tolerate without general approbation.
While this appears to be a smell test—“I know it when I see it”—it
is one of a particular and not entirely subjective kind. It is a collective
smell test verified in two important ways: (1) by resistance and
counterdemonstration on the part of those subjected to the practice,
and (2) by reasoned protest, both by those subjected to the practice
and by others.
The rights-seeking process of resistance, counterdemonstration,
and reasoned protest plays out on a micro level whenever an
infringement or denial of human dignity is challenged on
constitutional grounds. Cases involving children and their families

13. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Responsive Constitutionalism and the Idea of
Dignity, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1373, 1373 (2009).
14. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656–57 (2008).
15. Conversely, we might agree with the Stoics that we affront human dignity
when we engage in behavior that is unworthy of human creatures or “inhumane.” In
this alternative sense, dignity is a quality that we achieve through our behavior,
whereas in the former sense dignity is inalienable. These two understandings of
dignity are not congruent. We might think it undignified (unworthy of a human
being) to torture any animal, but this is not to say that the animal is endowed with
human dignity.
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are special in that they often call for reconciliation of the different,
sometimes competing dignitary or constitutional rights of various
family members—often those of children and those of their parents.
II. CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
The following case analyses embody this requirement of
simultaneous respect. In assessing each, we are required to balance
the dignitary status a government owes to children with the dignitary
status it owes to the adults who care for them.
The first cases, Meyer and Pierce, are usually cited as pillars of the
principle that parents have a constitutional right to maintain and
manage, without official interference, custody and control of their
children.16 However, Pierce should also be remembered as the case
that dampened, and perhaps precluded, wholehearted efforts to
provide universal, high quality education. Therefore, it holds lessons
about the tension between educating young citizens in an
economically diverse community, and honoring the wishes and
ambitions of all parents.
Next, I will discuss Wisconsin v. Yoder.17 Like Pierce, it stands for
the principle of parental autonomy. However, it raises questions
about a child’s right to know and draw from worlds beyond a
community that is isolated, whether by choice or circumstance.
Therefore, it holds lessons about the tension between subcultural
integrity and cosmopolitan exposure.
Finally, I will discuss the cases from Castle Rock, Colorado and
from the town of Neenah, in Winnebego County, Wisconsin that
interrogate communities’ obligations to police families for the
protection of vulnerable family members.18 These cases, therefore,
speak to the tension between assuring public safety and protecting
privacy.
I will argue that thoughtful and simultaneous respect is necessary—
although I cannot claim that it is sufficient—to successfully manage
the tensions between protecting and nurturing a city’s youngest

16. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
17. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that an
individual does not have a right to police enforcement of restraining orders where
police failed to enforce a mother’s restraining order against her children’s father and
the father abducted and murdered their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
234 (1972) (holding that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state cannot
compel an Amish family to cause their children to attend formal high school).
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citizens and guarding the democratic freedom owed to all of its
citizens. I will stress the importance of respect across genders, classes,
sub-cultures, and generations. At bottom, though, I want to call
attention to the kind of respect that is described in human rights
discourse as the respect warranted by recognition of the inherent
dignity of every human being.
A. Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters: Families,
Education, and Economic Diversity
Robert Meyer was a teacher who unlawfully taught reading in the
German language to a ten-year-old child in a one-room parochial
school in Nebraska.19 The Society of Sisters operated a parochial
school in Oregon, and the Hill Military Academy was a for-profit
private school in Oregon. 20 These parties were joined by parents of
children in their schools to challenge state laws that were passed with
disparate motives; some xenophobic and others, expressions of
collective responsibility.21
World War II inflamed parochial and nativist sentiments, as well as
narrow patriotism.22 At the same time, communities acted on a desire
to promote a healthy democracy by making basic education
universal.23
This mix of sentiments yielded public school
requirements, and prohibitions against teaching children languages
other than English, that were advocated both as protections against
“foreign” influences and as guarantees of an egalitarian and wellfunctioning democracy.24
Advocates for the parents, teachers, and private and parochial
schools challenged these laws, stressing the more prominent and more
assailable motives: the need to promote the right kind of patriotism,

19. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923).
20. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–32 (1925).
21. See DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
1785–1954, at 155 (1987); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995,
1041–46 (1992) (discussing the concept of the child as the parents’ property and the
property rights invoked by the parents in these cases).
22. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA,
1919–1920, at 3–17 (1955); see also Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20.
23. See Kristen Safier, Note, The Question of a Fundamental Right to a
Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993 (2001); Woodhouse, supra
note 21, at 1016–20.
24. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FAMILY VALUES (1997); Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20.
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to reject foreign ideologies, and to inhibit foreign influence.25 They
condemned mandatory public schooling as a Platonic and Bolshevist
idea that had no place in a free democracy.26 The Supreme Court
took the bait.
In Meyer, the case challenging a state law restricting foreign
language education, Justice McReynolds referenced the Spartan
practice of placing fit six-year-olds in the care of guardians who would
prepare them to be citizen warriors and concluded that such
proposals were inconsistent with the United States’ founding
principles.27 In Pierce, the case challenging a state law mandating
public school enrollment, Justice McReynolds again wrote, this time
for a unanimous Court, to say that “[t]he fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only.”28 Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment came to stand for the principle of family
liberty.29 Yet at the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment came to
be seen as a barrier against what might be our best collective response
to class-based gaps in the quality of childhood education—gaps that
grow as they mirror and perpetuate an expanding crisis of income
disparity.
Concerns about self-perpetuating inequality should cause us to
think freely and constructively about common schools and common
systems of childcare. Écoles Maternelle in France are public preKindergarten settings of such quality that: (1) few parents choose
private options, and (2) there is little or no opposition to the public
investment required to offer excellent care.30 New York City Mayor
25. See Woodhouse, supra note 21, at 1016–20.
26. See id.
27. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1923).
28. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
29. The Court’s reliance on the right to teach and to operate a school is a
reminder that the case also stands for principles of economic liberty: “[Plaintiffs]
asked [for] protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with
their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.” Id. at
536.
30. France has had a system of mandatory, free public education since the late
nineteenth century. See Shanny Peer & John Burbank, Focus on Early Learning:
Lessons from the French École Maternelle, ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST. 4, (Jan. 2004),
http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/early-learning/EcolesMaternellesJan04.pdf [https://perma.cc/87CK-X3X7] (“There is broad public support for école
maternelle in France, where early education and care are viewed not only as a private
concern for parents, but as a public good and a public responsibility. The importance
of pre-kindergarten and other services for young French children is unquestioned,
taken for granted by parents, politicians, and the public alike. A consensus exists
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Bill de Blasio’s free pre-kindergarten initiative might be thought of
similarly. It may be a mistake to criticize the program, as some have,
as money wasted on families able to afford private systems of care. In
fact, it might be hugely beneficial if New York children of all classes
mingle in settings fit for the nurturing and socialization of young
citizens.
B.

Wisconsin v. Yoder: Open Opportunity and Cultural Diversity

Wisconsin v. Yoder solidified (at least temporarily) the principle of
parental authority and autonomy announced in Meyer and Pierce,
and cautioned against indifference to children’s’ needs.31 It involved
Amish parents who resisted a less onerous requirement than the one
challenged in Pierce—a requirement that children attend some
school, public or private, until the age of sixteen.32 These parents
objected to formal education beyond the eighth grade and wished to
remove their children from school whenever they had completed
eighth grade.33 They regarded secular high school as a corrupting
experience and wished to engage their children instead in the
program of learning through work that their religion required.34
As the Court explained, the Amish community believed that “high
school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments,
self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with
other students,”35 whereas “Amish society emphasizes informal
learning-through-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of
intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community
welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than
integration with, contemporary worldly society.”36
The case was well-litigated on behalf of the Amish parents. The
record contained expert testimony supporting the position that
ordinary high school education would be both emotionally harmful to
Amish children and destructive to the Amish community.37 The
expert testimony was buttressed with evidence that the Amish way of

across the political spectrum about the importance of école maternelle, and it
receives support from all political parties. Not to support it would be political suicide
for a politician.”).
31. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West 2016); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
33. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
34. See id. at 210.
35. Id. at 211.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 216–19.
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rearing children produced citizens who were exceptionally lawabiding and self-sufficient as farmers and housewives.38 On this
record, the Supreme Court held, both as a matter of religious freedom
and as a matter of constitutionally protected parental rights that
Amish parents had to be exempt from the requirement to send their
children to school until the age of sixteen.39
The disposition of this case was not a foregone conclusion. The
Court had long held that religious conviction could not protect plural
marriages.40 Moreover, it had held that religious and familial rights
were too feeble to protect a family member’s choice to permit her
child to follow a religious obligation to distribute proselytizing
literature.41 Nonetheless, only Justice Douglas voiced any dissent in
Yoder. He dissented with respect to those cases in which the
With his eye
parent(s), not the child, had sought relief.42
simultaneously on the child’s freedom and potential and on the
parents’ authority, Douglas argued that the decision affected the
liberty interests of a child who “may want to be a pianist or an
astronaut or an oceanographer.”43
Toleration of diverse child-rearing practices is key to our
democracy. It assures that our culture is enriched by different
grounding philosophies, values, and life choices. It protects against
what Justice Douglas himself referred to in another context as a
totalitarian theory of culture and governance.44 Democracy means, in
part, freedom to reject state-sanctioned orthodoxies and go one’s own
way. Still, democracies are concerned with the nurturance of young
citizens, and it is not wrong to ask that they be given an educational—
not to speak of a material (in the form of food, shelter, and protection

See id. at 222.
See id. at 232–34.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521–22 (1961) (quoting R. L. Calhoun,
Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L. F. 31, 36 (1960)) (“One of the earmarks of
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

the totalitarian understanding of society is that it seeks to make all subcommunities—
family, school, business, press, church—completely subject to control by the State.
The State then is not one vital institution among others: a policeman, a referee, and a
source of initiative for the common good. Instead, it seeks to be coextensive with
family and school, press, business community, and the Church, so that all of these
component interest groups are, in principle, reduced to organs and agencies of the
State. In a democratic political order, this megatherian concept is expressly rejected
as out of accord with the democratic understanding of social good, and with the
actual make-up of the human community.”).
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from violence)—platform from which they may find their own way in
life. The difficulty is in distinguishing platforms of support and
channels to orthodox choices.
The Italian town of Reggio Emilia has famously avoided the Scylla
of indoctrination and the Charybdis of neglect by creating preschools
that nurture, not by feeding information and instruction, but instead
by encouraging activities that honor each child’s independence,
encourage collaboration rather than hierarchy, and demonstrate faith
that children will learn as they follow their curiosity.45
The principle of family announced in Meyer and followed in Pierce
is admirable, but Justice Douglas was right to caution that we owe
respect both to the dignity of independent families and to the dignity
and the unknowable potential of a developing child. Social support
need not be totalitarian, and as the Reggio schools demonstrate,
education systems can be designed to liberate rather than to
indoctrinate.
C. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
and Castle Rock v. Gonzales: The Tension Between Public Safety
and Family Privacy
The last cases—DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services46 and Castle Rock v. Gonzales47—present the dangers

of failures of support. They are representative of a jurisprudential
tradition that insists that our constitution is one of negative, not
positive rights. That tradition guarantees freedom from government
intervention, but does not confer positive rights or benefits.
The dissenting justices in Obergefell v. Hodges, the same-sex
marriage case, most recently and prominently relied on this
tradition.48 Justice Roberts said, for example that “[o]ur cases have
consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided
by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive
entitlements from the State.”49 In support of this assertion, the Chief
Justice cited DeShaney as well as San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,50 a case arguably holding that our federal

45. See CAROLYN EDWARDS ET AL., THE HUNDRED LANGUAGES OF CHILDREN:
THE REGGIO EMILIA APPROACH TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION (1993).
46. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
47. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
48. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
49. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
50. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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constitution contains no guarantee of a right to education. As I will
discuss later, Justice Roberts could also have cited Gonzales.51
DeShaney involved the claim of a child who had been severely
brain-damaged as a result of repeated beatings by his father.52 The
family had been under the supervision of an official child protective
agency for more than two years53 during which the child was twice
hospitalized as a result of his father’s violence.54 The child’s claim
was that as a matter of due process this government agency owed him
a duty of protection that it had negligently failed to meet.55 A
majority of the Justices rejected the child’s claim, holding, in effect,
that it was what Justice Roberts described in his Obergefell dissent:
an unauthorized request for positive rights.56
The Gonzales case was similar.57 Jessica Gonzales had been a
victim of domestic violence.58 She had gone to a local court and
obtained a strongly worded order of protection.59 The strong wording
reflected feminist efforts over the years to assure that such orders
would provide some measure of actual protection.60 The order
announced that the arrest of her abusive husband was mandatory in
the face of reasonable evidence of a violation of its terms.61
Jessica Gonzales called her local precinct repeatedly over the
course of an evening to report that her husband had taken their three
daughters in violation of the order and that she feared for her
daughters’ safety.62 With each call, she was told to wait to see what
happened and to call back if the matter was not resolved. Finally,

51. See infra notes 57–69 and accompanying text.
52. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191–93
(1989).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Compare id. at 204 (“The Court’s baseline is the absence of positive rights in
the Constitution and a concomitant suspicion of any claim that seems to depend on
such rights.”), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.
dissenting).
57. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
58. See id. at 751.
59. See id.
60. See id. (alteration in original) (“The original form order, issued on May 21,
1999, and served on respondent’s husband on June 4, 1999, commanded him not to
‘molest or disturb the peace of [respondent] or of any child,’ and to remain at least
100 yards from the family home at all times.”).
61. See id. at 752.
62. See id. at 753.
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after midnight, she went to the precinct.63 While she was there her
husband drove by, firing from his car window at the police station.64
The husband was killed by police officers’ return fire.65 The bodies of
the three girls were found in the trunk of his car.66
The Supreme Court held that the police had not violated a
constitutionally enforceable duty.67 Subsequently, however, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights issued a decision finding the
United States responsible for human rights violations against Jessica
Gonzales (then Jessica Lenahan) and her three deceased children for
its failure to take adequate measures to address domestic violence.68
The Commission relied on principles developed to assure that
governments address the realities of intra-familial abuse and
pervasive violence against women by providing appropriately
respectful and reasonably effective mechanisms against domestic
violence.69 In doing so, it honored the dignity of women and their
children while giving appropriate respect to the dignity and liberty of
their families.
CONCLUSION
What can we make of these cases and of the state of our laws
regarding families and children? Do we as a society have an
obligation to give children the physical and intellectual support to
become active members of a democratic citizenry? Do we have the
right—or the obligation—to expose them to ideas and opportunities
that their families may not favor? How do we protect a healthy
diversity and guard against totalitarian control? Putting aside the
question of whether we owe children any duty of nurturance or any
platform for choosing their own way and fulfilling their unique
potential, do we owe them any duty of basic protection?
These questions defy simple answers. But there are guides we
might follow as we attempt to resolve them: (1) we might join the
increasing number of nations that hold themselves, by constitution or

63. See id. at 753–54.
64. See id. at 754.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 768.
68. See generally Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, INTER-AM. COMM’N
H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011).
69. See id. Additional materials concerning Gonzales are available online. See
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/cases/jessica-gonzales-v-usa
[https://perma.cc/HN6E-VTFA].
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international treaty, obligated to respect the dignity of all human
beings and accept the possibility that respect for human dignity
implies positive obligations of nurturance and care, (2) we might bind
ourselves to honor the fact that respect for human dignity implies
respect for diverse life choices,70 and (3) we might commit ourselves
to struggling to reconcile these two propositions, for although both
are honorable they are all too easily at war with each other.
Attention to these guides would do much to assure that little
citizens thrive within democratically free families.

70. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1349 (1994) (“[N]eglected [antislavery] traditions
embody, and the second of the Reconstruction Amendments constitutionalizes, a
requirement that each person be given a measure of autonomy appropriate to the
thinking, morally conscious character of humankind: autonomy sufficient to allow
self-definition and substantial moral choice. Antislavery traditions also embody, and
the Fourteenth Amendment also reflects, recognition that self-definition and moral
autonomy depend upon an environment in which the socializing influences of
families and other intimate communities are not overwhelmed by the socializing
influences of the state—an environment in which chosen systems of values interact,
rather than one in which choice is inhibited and values are absolute and imposed.”).

